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We explore the role of sex in judging by addressing two questions of long-standing interest to political scientists: whether
and in what ways male and female judges decide cases distinctly—“individual effects”—and whether and in what ways
serving with a female judge causes males to behave differently—“panel effects.”While we attend to the dominant theoretical
accounts of why we might expect to observe either or both effects, we do not use the predominant statistical tools to
assess them. Instead, we deploy a more appropriate methodology: semiparametric matching, which follows from a formal
framework for causal inference. Applying matching methods to 13 areas of law, we observe consistent gender effects in only
one—sex discrimination. For these disputes, the probability of a judge deciding in favor of the party alleging discrimination
decreases by about 10 percentage points when the judge is a male. Likewise, when a woman serves on a panel with men, the
men are significantly more likely to rule in favor of the rights litigant. These results are consistent with an informational
account of gendered judging and are inconsistent with several others.
Ever since Jimmy Carter set out to diversify thefederal bench, scholars have been exploring theeffects of sex on judging. The result is now
a voluminous body of literature,1 which focuses on
two chief questions: whether and in what ways male
and female judges decide cases distinctly—“individual
effects”—and whether and in what ways serving with a
female judge causes males to behave differently—“panel
effects.”2
We too take up these important questions. In so
doing, we follow the lead of others writing in this area
and attend to the dominant extant accounts of why we
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1An appendix on our web site describes the results of some 30 studies on the topic. We should note that our focus is on sex, but, of course,
the federal bench has been diversified on the dimensions of race and color. The methodological approach we advocate here would be
equally suitable for exploring the effect of these characteristics on judges or, for that matter, legislators, advisors, attorneys, litigants, and
voters.
2Our phrasing is not accidental. For the reasons we supply in the second section, only the second question lends itself to causal inference.
might expect to observe either or both sex-based effects,
including accounts that stress information, representa-
tion, and socialization. We depart from existing work in
two ways. First, while most studies explore sex-based ef-
fects in a limited number of legal areas, we examine 13,
ranging from disability law to piercing the corporate veil
to, of course, sex discrimination. Analyzing a diverse set
of disputes, we believe, permits a more comprehensive
assessment of the implications of the various theoreti-
cal accounts. Second, while most previous work relies on
variants of standard regression analysis, we turn instead
to semiparametricmatchingmethods, which follow from
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a formal framework of causal inference. For the reasons
we outline below, these tools are better suited to the twin
tasks at hand: estimating individual and panel effects on
the federal appellate bench.
Our application of these methods unearths neither
individual nor panel effects in 12 of the 13 areas of the
law. Only in cases implicating sex discrimination do we
observe sex-based effects: the probability of a judge decid-
ing in favor of the party alleging discrimination decreases
by 10 percentage points when the judge is a male. Like-
wise, when a woman serves on a panel with men, the
men are significantly more likely to rule in favor of the
rights litigant. More generally, our findings are consistent
with informational accounts of gendered judging and are
inconsistent with several others.
Seen in this way, our study adds theoretically and
substantively to a burgeoning body of literature of inter-
est to social scientists, judges, and policy makers alike.
Given that our results reinforce the findings in several ex-
isting studies (e.g., Crowe 1999; Davis, Haire, and Songer
1993; Peresie 2005), however, ourmost important contri-
bution may be methodological. The matching methods
we deploy here hold a good deal of promise, we believe, to
advance our understanding of judicial behavior—not to
mention of sex (and race) effects in the other institutions
of government.
WhatWe Know about HowWomen
andMen Judge
Almost from the day JusticeO’Connor announced her re-
tirement from theU.S. SupremeCourt, pressuremounted
on President GeorgeW. Bush to nominate a woman. Var-
ious news sources reported that elites on the left and right
thought the seat should be “reserved” for a female, and the
public concurred. Even the first lady ventured an opinion,
saying that she “would really like [the President] to name
another woman to the Supreme Court.”
Whether Bush acceded to this pressure with his (un-
successful) nomination of Harriet Miers is a matter of
some debate. But the entire episode raises the question
of why the pressure was there in the first place: why did
elites and the public alike support appointing a woman
to replace O’Connor? One answer centers on “social le-
gitimacy,” or the belief that “democratic institutions in
heterogeneous societies ought to reflect the make-up of
society” (Cameron and Cummings 2003, 28). On this
account, elected officials should work to ensure the com-
mensurate representation of women on the nation’s high-
est court inpart because theynowconstitute over one-half
of the U.S. population and nearly one-third of all lawyers
in the country.3
Another set of responses centers less on the sheer
presence of female judges and more on “their partici-
pation and their perspective” (Sherry 1986); that is, on
whether males and females behave differently (individual
effects) and whether females influence their male col-
leagues (panel effects). Falling into this set, as we show
in Table 1, are different voice, representational, informa-
tional, and organizational accounts of sex-based judg-
ing. Note that while three of the four posit differences in
the behavior of male and female judges, their underlying
mechanisms and, ultimately, their empirical implications,
are distinct.
In light of the prominence of these accounts—one or
more appears in virtually every study of gendered judg-
ing (see, e.g., Baldez, Epstein, and Martin 2006; Brud-
ney, Schiavoni, andMerrit 1999; Clark 2004; Farhang and
Wawro 2004; Martin, Reynolds, and Keith 2002; Peresie
2005; Sherry 1986; Sullivan 2002)—they require little
elaboration. Briefly, the first, the different voice approach,
follows from Gilligan’s (1982) seminal work.4 This ac-
count stresses divergencies between males and females—
primarily that they develop distinct worldviews and see
themselves as differentially connected to society. As a re-
sult, we would not expect much in the way of panel ef-
fects; given their differences, male and female judges are
unlikely to influence one another. Individual effects, how-
ever, should be quite extensive, emerging across virtually
all areas of the law. Indeed, if Gilligan’s work has any
implications for judging, it is that female judges bring
a “feminine perspective” to the bench—one that “en-
compasses all aspects of society, whether or not they af-
fect men and women differently,” and not only “the po-
litical agenda associated with feminism” (Sherry 1986,
160; see also Davis 1992; Steffensmeier and Herbert
1999).
For representational accounts, that “political agenda”
moves to the fore. The idea here, tracing to Pitkin’s
3Other forms of this argument center on the “inherent unfairness”
of only men occupying seats of power; on the desirability of input
from all parts of a diverse society; and on the courts’ need for legit-
imacy, which cannot be achieved if a “segment of the population is
excluded frommembership” (see, e.g., Epstein, Knight, andMartin
2003; Maule 2000, 296–97).
4In a Different Voice has faced its share of criticism on any number
of grounds—sociological, biological, psychological, and method-
ological. And yet, as Beiner writes, despite the critiques, Gilligan’s
“theory no doubt continues to be taught, discussed, and tested be-
cause something about it rings true, or at least true based on some
stereotyped notion of the way in which women behave” (2002,
602). Based on our inventory of the literature, Beiner has it exactly
right.
SEX AND JUDGING 391
TABLE 1 Accounts of Sex Effects on Judging
Empirical Implications
Account Premise
Individual Effects Panel Effects
Different Voice Males and females develop
distinct worldviews and see
themselves as differentially
connected to society
Yes, across a range of issues None expected
Representational Female judges serve as
representatives of their class
and so work toward its
protection in litigation of
direct interest
Yes, but only on issues of
concern to women broadly
speaking
None expected
Informational Women possess unique and
valuable information
emanating from shared
professional experiences
Yes, but only on issues on
which female judges may
possess valuable expertise,
experience, or information
Yes, but only on issues on
which female judges may
possess valuable expertise,
experience, or information
Organizational Male and female judges
undergo identical
professional training, obtain
their jobs through the same
procedures, and confront
similar constraints once on
the bench
No. Male and female judges
are more alike than dissimilar
and face common
professional constraints
None expected
“Individual Effects” are whether and in what ways male and female judges decide cases distinctly; “Panel Effects” are whether and in what
ways serving with a female judge causes her male colleagues to behave differently.
(1967) work, is that female judges serve as representa-
tives of their class and work toward its protection in lit-
igation of direct interest—or, as Cook famously put it,
“the organized campaign to place more women on the
bench rest[ed] on the hope that women judges will seize
decision-making opportunities to liberate other women”
(1981, 216; see also, e.g., Allen andWall 1993;Martin and
Pyle 2005; Tobias 1990).5 Consequently, this account too
posits individual effects, but they should manifest them-
selves in a smaller set of cases—only those involving issues
“where the policy consequences are likely to have imme-
diate and direct impact on significantly larger numbers of
women than men” (Carroll 1984, 308). Common exam-
ples of such “women’s issues” in the law include abortion,
affirmative action, sex discrimination in employment,
and sexual harassment.6
5Some recent research on world legislatures has found that women
are not always alone in advocating for women’s issues and interests
(e.g., Dahlerup 2006).
6Worth noting is the existence of a robust debate over what consti-
tutes a women’s issue (compare, e.g., Thomas 1994 and Reingold
2000) such that some analysts would dispute the categories we list
To the extent that informational accounts suggest the
emergence of individual effects in a few legal areas, they
converge with representational theories. But the similar-
ities end there. The logic behind informational or exper-
tise approaches is not that women represent a particular
class but rather that they possess unique and valuable
information emanating from shared professional expe-
riences (Cameron and Cummings 2003; Gryski, Main,
and Dixon 1986; Peresie 2005). Accordingly, sex-based
effects are likely to manifest themselves in an even more
circumscribed set of cases—primarily sex discrimination
in the employment context.7 But the effects themselves
in the text. Within the literature on judging, however, it is not un-
common to adopt a rather narrow definition of “women’s issue,”
as we do here (see, e.g., Martin and Pyle 2000; Segal 2000; Walker
and Barrow 1985).
7When presenting our paper to various professional audiences, in-
teresting debates ensued overwhetherwe should limit the empirical
implication here to sex-based employment discrimination or ex-
pand it to include abortion and sexual harassment as well. Those
advocating greater inclusiveness emphasize that female judges may
have stronger priors as a result of their experience with harassment
or abortion. Those advocating less inclusiveness suggest that only
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are likely to be broader, not only increasing the odds
of a pro-plaintiff decision by female judges in employ-
ment litigation but also by the male judges with whom
they sit. The reason is straightforward enough: because,
under this approach, female judges possess information
that their male colleagues perceive “as more credible and
persuasive” than their own knowledge about sex discrim-
ination, females can directly or even indirectly alter the
choicesmade bymales (i.e., induce them todecide sex dis-
crimination cases differently than they otherwise would;
Peresie 2005, 1783; see also, e.g., Baldez, Epstein, and
Martin 2006; Cameron and Cummings 2003; Ostberg
and Wetstein 2007; Sullivan 2002).8
Finally, we turn to approaches that emphasize the
commonalities between male and female judges, or what
some call organizational accounts (e.g., Steffensmeier and
Herbert 1999). While not necessarily denigrating the im-
portance of diversity for, say, promoting social legitimacy,
these analysts suggest that we are unlikely to observe
any sex-based effects in the courts. After all, they argue,
male and female judges undergo identical professional
training, obtain their jobs through the same procedures,
and confront similar constraints once on the bench (see,
e.g., Kritzer and Uhlman 1977; Sisk, Heise, and Mor-
riss 1998). These commonalities should be sufficient “to
in the area of employment discrimination are female judges likely
to have common experiences emanating from their work—both
before and after ascending to the bench—in a male-dominated oc-
cupation (see, e.g., Avery, McKay, and Wilson 2008; Posner 2008).
They also point to public opinion data indicating no significant
differences between males and females on abortion but consider-
able differences on the question of whether more should be done
to eliminate gender discrimination in the workforce. The data also
show that a majority of women have faced discrimination in em-
ployment. To us, those advocating the narrower approach to in-
formation accounts have the better theoretical case. But, for the
purpose of our empirical assessment, the difference is less impor-
tant because we can distinguish between representational (which
include abortion and harassment) and informational accounts on
the basis of panel effects (see Table 1).
8This account is similar to cue taking in Congress, such that legis-
lators may rely on cues in the form of information from “expert”
colleagues to helpwith their voting decisions (see, e.g., Bianco 1997;
Fowler 2006; Matthews and Stimson 1975). On these accounts, the
information need not take the formof direct persuasion on the part
of the expert (here, a female judge); her vote or even her presence
may be enough.
Another possible mechanism is that a male judge alters his votes
in the presence of females but for collegial or strategic reasons (for
more on both, see, e.g., Sunstein et al. 2006). Our emphasis on
female“s” is purposeful: testing either or both comprehensively is
possible only if two females sat on a panel with one male in a non-
trivial fraction of panels (in which case we would expect the male
to refrain from dissenting). But this type of mixed panel is rarely
present in our dataset (see note 10). As a result, we can only explore
this idea unidirectionally: that the female would not dissent (i.e.,
would not cast a pro-plaintiff vote) in the presence of two males,
all else being equal.
overcome any biological, psychological, or experienced-
based differences between the sexes” (Steffensmeier and
Herbert 1999, 1165).
However different these accounts (and however dis-
tinct their empirical implications), scholars have devised
remarkably similar designs and employed nearly identical
methods to explore them. Virtually all quantitative work
in this area:
1. asks the same research questions: Does gender
cause judges to behave differently (individual ef-
fects)? And, more recently, does the presence of a
female judge cause male judges to act differently
(panel effects)?;
2. makes use of a dichotomous regression model
(typically logit or probit), with the judge’s vote
(e.g., for or against the plaintiff in sex discrimina-
tion cases) serving as the dependent variable;
3. captures the effect of sex in the same way, as a
dummy variable for the sex of the judge (for indi-
vidual effects) or a series of dummy variables for
the sex of panel members (for panel effects); and
4. attends to (approximately) the same covariates
(i.e., confounding factors), chiefly attributes of
the judge (e.g., ideology, age, judicial experience,
race) and characteristics of the case (e.g., direction
of lower court decision, year of decisions).
Despite the similarities in approach, the resulting re-
search findings have been somewhatmixed. By our count,
social scientists and legal academics have produced over
30 systematic, multivariate analyses of the extent to which
female judgesmake decisions distinct from theirmale col-
leagues (individual effects) or causemale judges to behave
differently than they otherwise would (panel effects).9 Of
these, roughly one-third purport to demonstrate clear
panel or individual effects, a third report mixed re-
sults, and the final third find no sex-based differences
whatsoever.
Drawing Causal Inferences about
Sex and Judging
Why themixed findings is of less immediate interest to us
than thequestionof howbest to isolate sex effects, if in fact
they exist. In what follows, we undertake this challenge,
9We focus here, and in the online appendix, on studies relying on
quantitative evidence. There are also scores of descriptive studies,
and they too reach competing conclusions. Compare, e.g., Artis
(2004) and Bussel (2000).
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not by offering a critique of the existing approaches, but
rather by returning to first principles—theoretical and
methodological approaches to drawing causal inferences.
The Potential Outcomes Framework
for Causal Inference
Of interest to us and many others working in this area is
whether and in what ways gender leads judges to behave
differently. For a panel of judges hearing a case on an
intermediate appellate court, for example, we aspire to
estimate the extent to which the presence of a female
judge causes male judges to vote in a particular direction
when they otherwise would not.10
Estimating this causal effect demands counterfactual
analysis (see, generally, Epstein et al. 2005; Epstein and
King 2002; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). We want to
learn how a male judge would vote on a panel with a
female judge but for the presence of the female judge. Un-
dertaking it requires us to determine the effect of a female
judge for any given panel composition, along with any
other relevant (i.e., confounding) case and judge factors
(such as the sex of the litigant and the ideology of the
judge).
This task would be straightforward enough in a re-
search environment lacking constraints. We would create
an all-male panel and ask it to decide a sex discrimination
case; then we would rerun history, holding everything
constant except the absence of a female judge, and ask
the panel to decide the same case. If we observed the men
voting against the plaintiff when serving on the all-male
panel but supporting the plaintiff when serving with a
woman, then we might conclude that the female had an
effect on the panel and that the effect was in the direc-
tion anticipated by at least one theoretical account of sex
difference.
For amore formal accounting of this type of analysis,
we adopt the potential outcomes framework posited by
Neyman (1935) and Rubin (1973, 1974), thoroughly re-
viewed inHolland (1986), and recently applied inpolitical
science by Imai (2005) and Epstein et al. (2005). Under
this framework, let the unit of analysis for our panel-
effect example be the judge-vote cast by a male judge,
and i = 1, . . . , N index each observation. Further, let Yi
10Throughout this section, we focus on panel (rather than individ-
ual) effects because sex cannot be treated as a causal variable for
purposes of investigating whether male and female judges decide
cases differently. For more on this point, see the section “Sex as a
Causal Variable” below. We also note that our research design does
not attempt to account for any effects that might be due to accu-
mulated “exposure” to diversity when individual judges repeatedly
serve with one another (see Berger, Conner, and Fisek 1974).
denote an outcome variable; say, whether the judge voted
for (Yi = 1) or against (Yi = 0) the plaintiff in a discrimi-
nation suit. Finally, each judge-vote takes place under one
of two treatment conditions: the control group, denoted
Ti = 0, includes the panels where the other two judges are
male (an all-male panel); the treatment group, denoted
Ti = 1, consists of those panels with at least one female
judge (a mixed-sex panel).11 Note that this notation is in
terms of potential outcomes: the case potentially could
have been decided by an all-male or mixed-sex panel, and
the panel could have decided it for or against the plaintiff.
Under this framework and consistent with the
Neyman-Rubin model, we can now formally define the
causal effect for each observation (! subscripted by i) as
the difference between the two potential outcomes:
!i = Yi (Ti = 1)− Yi (Ti = 0) (1)
Observe that we have explicitly incorporated the counter-
factual state of the world—or the treatment effect—for
each observation. Because we observe only one of the two
states of the world on the right-hand side of equation (1),
this formulation consists of the difference between a fac-
tual and counterfactual. To summarize that effect—the
causal effect of sex—across a number of observations, we
can estimate !¯ , the average treatment effect (ATE), as:
!¯ = E [Yi (Ti = 1)]− E [Yi (Ti = 0)] (2)
The difficulty, of course, is that in the real world of
research we cannot rerun history to estimate the counter-
factual and obtain !i and its summary !¯ . This is known
as the fundamental problem of causal inference (Holland
1986, 947). It simply means that, for any given observa-
tional unit, wewill never observe the outcome under both
the treatment (amixed-sex panel) and the control (an all-
male panel). Instead, we see the judge-vote either when it
takes place under the control Yi (Ti = 0) or the treatment
Yi (Ti = 1). To put it another way, we can only observe
the factual (e.g., if the panel was, in fact, all male, then
we observe an all-male panel) and not the counterfactual
(e.g., observing a mixed-sex panel, if the panel was in fact
composed of all males). Consequently, and depending on
the research setting , we must make certain assumptions to
estimate !i .
Consider, first, the experimental setting.Werewe able
to randomly select judges and in turn assign them, again
randomly, to treatment and control groups, we would as-
sume that assignment is independent of all other observed
11An alternative approach is to define two treatment groups: one
with just one female on the panel and another with two females on
the panel. We define the treatment as we do for several reasons, not
the least of which is purely pragmatic: our datasets lack a sufficient
number of panels with two females to perform this sort of analysis.
(And, not surprisingly, we observe no panels with three females.)
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pretreated covariates (denoted Xi ). And then—with the
assumption of independent assignmentmet—as the sam-
ple size grows, all observed andunobserved covariateswill
be balanced across the treatment and control groups due
solely to the presence of randomization. Present also is
the “stable unit treatment value assumption” (SUTVA;
Rubin 1974), which states that the potential outcome of
one unit does not depend on the treatment assignment
of another unit.12
Because most experimental settings easily meet
SUTVAand theassumptionof independent assignment to
treatment, researchers can estimate the average treatment
effect by doing nothing more complicated than comput-
ing the differences of means:
!¯ = E [Yi (Ti = 1)]− E [Yi (Ti = 0)]
= E [Yi |Ti = 1]− E [Yi |Ti = 0] (3)
Unfortunately, of course, in most studies of
judging—including ours—executing an experiment of
this sort is nearly as impossible as rerunning history.
While it is true that theU.S. appellate courts use a “wheel”
to assign judges to panels, logic and practice counsels
against deeming it a mechanism for true random selec-
tion.13 As a result, judicial specialists, again us included,
must work with observational data, which substantially
complicate the inferential task. One obstacle is that the as-
sumption of independent assignment to treatment rarely,
if ever, holds. This is not insurmountable, however, if
we can condition on our observed covariates (Xi ) and if
the assumption of conditional ignorability holds. Should
we have the appropriate pretreatment covariates—for a
study of panel effects, judge-specific and case-specific co-
variates that precede panel assignment14—we can then
12This assumption likely will be violated in the descriptive indi-
vidual effects analysis that follows (and relaxing it is beyond the
scope of our project). Importantly, though, if this violation occurs
in our data, any estimated effects would be attenuated toward zero.
Thus, any resulting estimates of the average treatment effects will
be overly conservative.
13Even if it were true that assignment in the circuit courts was
random—less and less likely given the growing number of senior-
status judges—we confront the problem of inherent stratification
in the federal judiciary. We expect that across circuits, profound
imbalances may exist on crucial covariates (e.g., ideology). Only
if cases were randomly assigned across all circuits (such that any
case could be assigned to any three judges) would we expect all
other covariates to be balanced. And even in that case, Ho et al.
(2007) suggest that using matching methods to balance covariates
is appropriate in experimental settings to mitigate against possible
confounders.
14It is generally important to include only pretreatment covariates
in any causal analysis. Posttreatment covariates may be affected by
the treatment, thus confounding estimation of causal effects. In
assume that conditional on them, assignment to treat-
ment is unconfounded; that is, after controlling for the
covariates, the probability of being assigned to the treat-
ment group is not correlated with the outcome variable.
With this obstacle hurdled, and the additional as-
sumptions of SUTVA and strong ignorability met,15 we
can proceed to estimate the ATE !¯ :
!¯ = E [Yi (Ti = 1)|Xi ]− E [Yi (Ti = 0)|Xi ]
= E [Yi |Xi , Ti = 1]− E [Yi |Xi , Ti = 0] (4)
But how ought we estimate this effect? This question
has been the subject of virtually no debate within public
law and gender politics circles. Instead, a single approach
has long dominated efforts in these fields to perform
causal inference with observational data—including ef-
forts to study gendered judging: linear regression models
(or their variants for dichotomous dependent variables,
such as logit or probit). The typical approach, as wemen-
tioned earlier, is to regress an outcome variable of interest
(usually the judge’s vote, either for or against the sex-
discrimination plaintiff) on a dichotomous sex variable
and a handful of controls, including additional informa-
tion about the judges (e.g., their ideology) and the cases
(e.g., direction of lower court decision).
To be sure, linear regression provides analysts with
a particular type of statistical control, and, if certain as-
sumptions are met, the model will provide reliable in-
ferences about causal effects. But equally as apparent are
several very serious limitations—not the least of which is
that linear regression assumes the presence of a precise
functional form for the relationship between the treat-
ment and outcome, measured covariates and the treat-
ment, and measured covariates and the outcome.16 In
an experimental setting, where treatment assignment is
randomized, this assumption is easily met. For obser-
vational data, however, we cannot depend on random
assignment to ensure that our covariates are systemat-
ically unrelated to our treatment variable. As a result,
narrow circumstances posttreatment variables can be included to
obtain conditional ignorability.
15“Strong ignorability” (Dehejia andWahba 1999; Rosenbaum and
Rubin 1983; Smith 1997) implies that assignment to treatment is
unconfounded and that overlap exists between the treatment and
control groups.
16Another limitation is that our definition of a causal effect in equa-
tion (1) does not require constant effects across all observations,
but the linear regression model does (Greiner 2008; Rubin 1973;
Winship and Morgan 1999). In some cases this strong linearity
assumption might be justified, but there is no reason to assume
ex ante that it holds. And, if it does not, we can inappropriately
estimate the causal effect without much effort (for illustrations, see
Greiner 2008; Ho et al. 2007).
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imbalances frequently emerge. Since performing causal
inference requires researchers to limit their analyses to
the range of values for which they have data in the treat-
mentand the control groups,17 thepresenceof imbalances
can undermine the integrity of regression results. With-
out accounting for these imbalances in the covariates,
analysts wind up comparing the equivalent of apples and
oranges.
Because the regression model too readily extrapo-
lates beyond the range of the observed data, this may
well be a rather frequent occurrence in analyses of legal
decisions—and perhaps especially in work on gendered
judging. To see why, consider that in virtually all studies
of this sort the researcher takes into account, in addition
to the judges’ sex, their ideology. This is a sensible choice:
we know that ideology is an important determinant of
judicial decisions. But since female judges are, on aver-
age, far more liberal than their male colleagues, it is also
a problematic choice. Figure 1 nicely illustrates the point.
Looking at U.S. Court of Appeals judges who voted in
disputes over sex discrimination in employment (Title
VII) or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
using their Judicial Common Space scores (Epstein et al.
2007; Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers 2001) tomeasure ide-
ology, we can see that the men are rather evenly dispersed
between liberal and conservative groupings. Women, in
contrast, noticeably skew to the left.
Data of this sort are so imbalanced that regression
analysis could produce profoundly misleading results. In
concrete terms, because the range or distribution of ide-
ology is, at least for now, sufficiently different between
male and female judges serving on the federal courts, a
linear regression model of their votes on their sex and
ideology might well estimate a significant and negative
treatment effect (men aremore likely to cast left-of-center
votes), when, in reality, the treatment effect is positive!18
Under such circumstances, the only way to ensure a reli-
able estimate of the average treatment effect is to obtain
balance on the covariates; i.e., to compare apples and
apples.19
17This is the notion of common support, which is part of the
assumption of “strong ignorability” (see note 15, King and Zeng
2006, and Smith 1997, 349).
18For other examples of this general phenomenon, see Greiner
(2008) and Ho et al. (2007).
19The lack of balance depicted in Figure 1 shores up yet another
problem with using linear regression to estimate equation (4). Lin-
ear regression allows us to assess the effect of the treatment on the
outcome, holding all else constant. But all else is likely not con-
stant when comparing the treatment and control groups, unless,
of course, they are balanced. This ceteris paribus assumption is
MatchingMethods for Performing
Causal Inference
In the simple example depicted in Figure 1 it is easy to
spot the imbalance, but when we incorporate more co-
variates, as we typically do, that task becomes essentially
impossible.More generally, while regression can be a use-
ful and appropriate tool in some settings, it often makes
assumptions that are unjustified in the study of judging
(Epstein et al. 2005).
If naively using linear regression can lead to mislead-
ing inference, especially whenwe expect imbalance in and
nonoverlap of the covariates, what are the viable alterna-
tives? The most promising is semiparametric matching,
where the idea is to estimate equation (4) only when units
are matched on all covariates. The intuition behind this
approach is easy to grasp: while we can neither rerun
history to see if male judges would decide the same case
differently on an all-male versus mixed-sex panel nor run
an experiment to test the same, we can match cases and
judges that are as similar as possible (except of course on
the key causal variable, the presence or absence of a female
judge) to make the same causal inference. In other words,
once we have conditioned on all the relevant confound-
ing factors (i.e., pretreatment covariates; see note 14), we
can attribute any remaining differences in the proportion
of votes cast for or against plaintiffs to the presence of a
female judge.
Whilematchingmethods are only beginning tomake
headway in political science (see, e.g., Epstein et al. 2005;
Imai 2005), they have gained considerable traction in
statistics and other related fields. And, actually, one form
of matching—exact matching—has even found its way
into the literature on gendered judging (see, e.g., Segal
2000; Walker and Barrow 1985). With exact matching,
the idea is to estimate equation (4) only when units are
matched on all covariates.
Exactmatching has the benefit of increasing the plau-
sibility of the assumption of strong ignorability. But it in-
troduces other problems, primarily the “curse of dimen-
sionality”: as the number of covariates increases, exact
justified when treatment assignment is random and independent,
as in an experimental setting, but it likely does not hold in most
observational studies. It is also worth noting that while there are
a variety of diagnostic tools associated with traditional regression
analyses, because imbalance has to do with the linear extrapolation
the model uses to estimate treatment effects and not model fit or
correlation among covariates, these tools are not designed to detect
a profound lack of balance that can result in the misestimation of
treatment effects (see, e.g., Greiner 2008 and Ho et al. 2007).
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FIGURE 1 The Ideology of U.S. Court of Appeals JudgesWho
Voted in Title VII Sex Discrimination and Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) Cases
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Each panel displays a kernel density plot that depicts the marginal distribution of ideology
(measured using the Judicial Common Space), from most liberal to most conservative, of
the participating U.S. Court of Appeals judges. The black line represents male judges and the
grey line represents female judges. Case data come from Sunstein et al. (2006) and ideology,
from Epstein et al. (2007).
matching itself can become increasingly implausible.20
To see the problem, suppose we began with the first sex
discrimination case decided by an appellate court panel
in 1995. Further suppose that the suit was decided in favor
of the female plaintiff by a mixed-sex panel on which the
men had fairly conservative ideological scores. Finally,
assume that the panel’s male judges were confirmed to
the bench in 1950 and 1966 and the female judge was
confirmed in 1979. To find an exact match for this case
we would need to identify a dispute and a panel that
had the same values on all the potentially confound-
ing variables—in this example, a suit resolved in 1995
by a panel with two relatively right-of-center men with
these precise confirmation years—but on which a female
judge, and not three males, sat. Because such an exact
match may not exist in our database, we would be forced
to discard this dispute, and likely countless others, from
our analysis. And the problem—the curse really—only
grows exponentially as we add more covariates, such as
additional judge attributes and the direction of the lower
court decision.
To avoid unnecessarily wasting data, we create
matches that are not exact but are as close to exact as
20An additional problem with the exact-matching gender studies
is that they violate the mantra of “no causation without manipu-
lation.” For more on this point, see the section “Sex as a Causal
Variable” below.
possible. The approach we take is to match on a one-
dimensional summary of the pretreatment covariates
known as the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983, 1984). By calculating the predicted values from a
logistic regression of the treatment indicator Ti on only
the pretreatment covariates Xi , the idea is to obtain a sin-
gle variable—the estimated propensity score—that serves
as a summary of the covariates on the treatment and
control groups. With the propensity scores in hand, we
can utilize them to match observations (using a vari-
ety of strategies discussed below) without making any of
the strong parametric assumptions necessitated by linear
regression.
Sex as a Causal Variable
Estimating propensity scores and executing matching are
tasks that require the researcher to make a series of
choices, and momentarily we explain ours. But first we
must deal with a final conceptual complication—one that
implicates the specific research questions we ask and the
precise inferences we can draw. Simply put, a crucial and
by now obvious feature of the potential outcomes frame-
work is that for a treatment to be a cause there should
be “potential (regardless of whether it can be achieved in
practice or not) for exposing or not exposing each unit
to the action of a cause” (Holland 1986, 946). In practice,
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this means that attributes, such as a judge’s sex, cannot
be viewed as causes. As Cox tells us, in most cases, sex
“is not a causal variable but rather an intrinsic prop-
erty of the individual” (1992, 296). Drawing inferences
about sex, race, and other immutable characteristics is
methodologically quite challenging and is only now start-
ing to receive attention in the literatureoncausal inference
(see, e.g., Greiner and Rubin 2009; Imai and Yamamoto
2010).
Where does this leave us with the two research ques-
tions of interest? The second question—does the pres-
ence of a female judge on a panel cause male judges
to behave differently?—lends itself to causal analysis. In
principle, a case could have been heard by a panel with
only men or a panel with one or more women. As a
result, panel composition is (experimentally speaking)
subject to manipulation, and with suitable pretreatment
covariates, it is possible to estimate the average treat-
ment effect. To put it another way, because the values
of our observed covariates are determined before the
panel is assigned, we can assess the extent to which the
presence of a female judge causes male judges to behave
differently.
Our first research question (and the one that pre-
dominates in the existing literature)—domale and female
judges decide cases differently?—presents two problems.
First, because the treatment is the sex of the judge, most
would say that it fails to meet the “no causation with-
out manipulation” standard. Second, the other covari-
ates relevant to this question—whether centering on the
judge’s attributes (e.g., ideology and age) or the case’s
details (e.g., direction of the lower court decision)—
occur after the sex of the judge is determined. With only
posttreatment covariates, we cannot estimate a causal
effect.
The conclusion is thus inescapable: the question
of whether sex causes judges to behave differently is ill
posed. Instead, our data can only be informative on the
descriptive—though nonetheless interesting—matter of
whether male and female judges decide cases differently.
This does not imply, we hasten to note, a return to regres-
sion analysis without first balancing the database. Quite
the opposite: to perform better descriptive inference, we
still should harness the power of matching methods. As
Rubin himself observed,
[E]ven though it may not make sense to talk
about the ‘causal’ effect of a person being a white
student versus being a black student, it can be in-
teresting to compare whites and blacks with sim-
ilar background characteristics to see if there are
differences in academic achievement, and creat-
ingmatched black-white pairs is an intuitive way
to implement this comparison. (2006, 3)
Implementing Propensity
ScoreMatching
With that important caveat now noted, we turn to the
implementation of propensity score matching—a task
performed in four steps: selecting appropriate factors on
which to match cases and judges, amassing the data nec-
essary to assess the various accounts of gendered judg-
ing (see Table 1), estimating the propensity scores, and
matching observations. Once we have semiparametri-
cally processed the dataset in this way, we can sum-
marize the difference in judging for the first question
and estimate the causal effect for the second (Ho et al.
2007).
Beginning with the first step, choosing covariates,
we took cues from the large and well-established liter-
ature on judging in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (e.g.,
Cross 2007; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004;
Scherer 2005) and incorporated both judge-based at-
tributes (e.g., ideology and age) and case-specific factors
(e.g., year of decision and the direction of the lower court
decision).21
Our data on the votes cast by judges come from the
Sunstein et al. (2006) project on the federal appellate
courts. To determine whether Democratic judges reach
more liberal decisions than Republicans, and whether the
partisan composition of a panel affects votes as well, the
Sunstein team developed a database containing the deci-
sions of federal appellate court judges in 13 areas: abor-
tion, affirmative action, disability law (ADA cases), cam-
paign finance, capital punishment, the Contract Clause,
environmental protection (EPA cases), federalism, pierc-
ing the corporate veil, sex discrimination in employment
(Title VII), sexual harassment, the Takings Clause, and
race discrimination (Title VII).22 Not only are these data
of an extremely high quality in terms of their accuracy,
21In addition to the primary variable of interest, the logit models
we estimated incorporate the ideology of the judge, his or her year
of birth, and whether she or he is a minority. We also include year
fixed effects and a variable for the distance between the ideologies
of the judge and the circuit’s median judge. In addition, for the
individual effects models only, we incorporate the sex of the case’s
majority opinion writer. See footnote 24 for the contents of our
propensity score models.
22Full details on the searches used by Sunstein et al. to identify the
cases for the original datasets are available in Sunstein et al. (2006,
note 20–35). The appendix provides explicit detail on the number
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detail, and thoroughness, but, also, fortunately, given the
range of areas covered, they are extremely well suited to
assessing the various theoretical accounts of sex-based
judging. Under differences accounts, to reiterate, we an-
ticipate individual effects across most of, if not all, 13
areas. For representational approaches, we also expect in-
dividual differences, but they should be largely cabined to
abortion, affirmative action, sex discrimination, and sex-
ual harassment cases. If informational accounts are afoot,
we ought to observe both individual and panel effects
but in an even more circumscribed category of cases, sex
discrimination in employment.23
With the data in hand, we complete our final steps:
estimating propensity scores for each judge-vote in the
cases (for individual and panel effects) and matching the
observations (again, for individual and panel effects). For
both the individual and panel effects analyses, we used a
logistic regression of the treatment indicator on a num-
ber of covariates to estimate the propensity score. The
right-hand panels of Figure 2 depict the distribution of
the propensity scores prior to matching for the Title VII
sex discrimination and Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) cases (see note 22).24 For the sex discrimination
of observations and years of inclusion for each of the datasets in
our study.
Where appropriate todetail individual results in the remainderof
the article, we are consistent and generally limit our discussion and
visual displays to two exemplars: ADAand sex discrimination cases.
We should note that while we would like to discuss and visualize
all 13 issue areas, space limitations prevent us from providing a
wholesale accounting of all summary statistics and results in the
main text; as such, we implore the reader to consult the project’s
web site for similar information on each issue area.
23Onemight argue that informational accounts cover other areas in
which female judges could plausibly possess unique expertise (e.g.,
abortion and sexual harassment) and so their empirical implica-
tions are indistinguishable from approaches stressing representa-
tion. Even if one finds this claim compelling, it is important to keep
in mind a fundamental difference between the two accounts—not
over individual effects butoverpanel effects,which representational
approaches do not anticipate.
24For the ADA individual effects data, our estimated propensity
score model contains judge party, year of birth, year of birth-
squared, minority judge, judicial experience, and circuit dum-
mies. For the Title VII sex discrimination cases, our propensity
score model includes ideology, ideology-squared, confirmation
year, confirmation year-squared, ideology × confirmation year,
minority judge, minority judge× ideology, minority judge× con-
firmation year, and circuit dummies. Each model also contains
exact matching on year of decision and lower court decision.While
space limitations prevent us from reporting the contents of the
other estimated propensity score models here, these details will be
provided on the project’s web site. For each issue area we chose
propensity score models that provided the best balance between
the treatment and control groups. One implication of this is that
the same specification was not used in each issue area.
scores, note the lack of common support: we observe no
female judges in a broad propensity score area (roughly
beyond −4). A similar, if not as severe, issue exists for
the ADA propensity scores. The problem for both, and
the other 11 datasets as well, is a lack of balance on many
covariates, as Table 2 indicates. Note, though, that the
matching procedure was successful in remedying the im-
balances. A visual inspection of the left-hand panels of
Figure 2 suggests as much, and Table 1 confirms what
our eyes tell us. The percent reduction statistics and the
eQQ medians both show that for nearly all covariates,
matching greatly improved balance.25
Turning to panel effects, at first blush the left-hand
panels of Figure 3 seem to indicate that common support
for the ADA and Title VII sex discrimination cases is not
much of an issue.26 On further inspection, though, the
range of the propensity scores are more evenly spread for
male judges (the black line) than for the females (grey
line)—a fact that Table 3 confirms (note the presence of
imbalances in the scores and other covariates). Matching
markedly improves balance, as the percent reductions and
eQQ medians in Table 3 and the right-hand panels of
Figure 3 indicate.27 In other words, after matching, the
distribution of the propensity scores for the treatment
and control groups in each dataset appears quite similar,
suggesting that balance has been achieved.
Performing inference required one final step:
matching observations. For this task, we used
“nearest-neighbor” matching with replacement; that is,
for each “mixed-sex” observation (or female judge, for
25For the percent reduction in the difference of means between
the treatment and control groups, a reduction of 100% indicates
perfect balance. The eQQ median is the median difference in the
quantile-quantile plot for each variable; an eQQ median of zero is
indicative of perfect balance (see, e.g., Ho et al. 2007).
Also worthy of explanation is why the matched datasets have
fewer observations than the full datasets. While it may seem coun-
terintuitive, balanced data that are comparable—even if smaller in
number—are preferable to a complete sample for the purpose of
estimating causal effects. To work with the full dataset would likely
force us to rely on strong model assumptions to extrapolate, as we
discussed in the section “The Potential Outcomes Framework for
Causal Inference” above.
26The estimated ADApanel effects propensity scoremodel includes
ideology, ideology-squared, year of birth, year of birth-squared,
ideology x year of birth, minority judge, judicial experience, and
circuit dummies. The same model for the Title VII sex discrimi-
nation data includes ideology, ideology-squared, minority judge x
ideology, minority judge, and circuit dummies. Each model also
includes exact matching on year of decision and lower court direc-
tion. See also footnote 24.
27Note that in the case of confirmation year in Title VII sex discrim-
ination decisions, eQQ median actually increases. This difference
is not, however, statistically significant.
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FIGURE 2 Kernel Density Plots of the Estimated Propensity Score
for the ADA and Title VII Sex Discrimination
Individual Effects Analyses
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The black lines depict the density for all-male panels (control); the grey lines for mixed-sex
panels (treatment). Each left-hand panel represents the full datasets while the right-hand
panels display the propensity scores for only the matched data.
the individual analysis), the “all-male” observation (or
male judge) that has the closest propensity score is se-
lected.28 We implemented this approach bymatching ob-
servations from the control group (e.g., male judges on
all-male panels) multiple times (“with replacement”).29
28We used the MATCHIT package in R written by Ho et al. (2006) to
perform the matching. MATCHIT implements a variety of matching
methods, including nearest-neighbormatching, and provides tools
for assessing balance.
29Nearest neighbor matching also can be implemented without
replacement. Debates ensue over which of the many matching ap-
proaches is best (for reviews, see Diamond and Sekhon 2005; Ho
et al. 2007). For our analyses, we estimated the propensity score in a
number of ways and matched using different methods. Regardless
Empirical Results
With the balanced datasets in hand (along with weights
necessary for subsequent analyses), we turned to the task
of assessing the impact of the variables of interest. In terms
of implementing it, scholars are of two minds. Some sug-
gest that researchers can estimate the causal effect with lit-
tle more than a difference of proportions test (e.g., Smith
1997) because the data are now balanced. Others rec-
ommend proceeding in the typical fashion by parametri-
cally processing the now balanced database (e.g., Ho et al.
of the approach, we obtain results comparable to those reported in
the text.
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TABLE 2 Matching Summary Statistics for the Individual Effects Analyses for ADA and Title VII
Sex Discrimination Cases
ADA Cases
Full Data (N = 1956) Matched Data (N = 890)
Mean Mean eQQ Percent Mean Mean eQQ
Variable Treated Control Med Reduction Treated Control Med
Propensity Score 0.32 0.13 0.19 94.89 0.32 0.31 0.09
Minority Judge 0.09 0.11 0.00 · 0.09 0.12 0.00
Judicial Experience 0.47 0.47 0.00 · 0.47 0.48 0.00
Judicial Common Space −0.17 0.06 0.17 98.04 −0.17 −0.17 0.06
Confirmation Year 1991.14 1985.17 5.00 92.60 1991.14 1990.70 2.00
(Title VII) Sex Discrimination Cases
Full Data (N = 1245) Matched Data (N = 590)
Mean Mean eQQ Percent Mean Mean eQQ
Variable Treated Control Med Reduction Treated Control Med
Propensity Score −1.13 −2.75 1.58 91.67 −1.13 −1.27 0.57
Minority Judge 0.12 0.09 0.00 30.39 0.12 0.14 0.00
Judicial Experience 0.45 0.45 0.00 · 0.45 0.43 0.00
Judicial Common Space −0.12 0.10 0.16 81.48 −0.12 −0.08 0.11
Confirmation Year 1990.38 1984.58 6.00 98.12 1990.38 1990.27 2.00
The left portion of each table provides results for the full, unmatched data, while the right portion displays results after matching has taken
place. eQQ med is the median difference in the empirical quantile-quantile plot (an eQQ med of zero is ideal).
2007).We do bothwith the hope of unearthing consistent
results, and, as it turns out, this is (almost) precisely what
obtains.
Individual Results
We begin our analysis with the question of whether male
and female judges differ in their decisions over cases in
the 13 issue areas. Returning briefly to Table 1, the four
accounts of gendered judging present relatively diverse
empirical expectations with respect to individual effects:
for “different voice,” we should see effects across most,
if not all, of the issue areas; for representational, effects
should be limited to abortion, affirmative action, Title VII
sex discrimination, and sexual harassment; for informa-
tional, we expect only Title VII sex discrimination cases to
produce effects (but see note 23); and for organizational,
no effects at all are anticipated.
To assess these accounts, we estimated four different
models for each of the 13 datasets. The first two are the
conventional tests in this literature: logistic regressions
using the full unbalanced dataset—specifically a bivari-
ate, with the sex of the judge as the only covariate (the
equivalent of a difference of proportions test); and a fully
specified model incorporating the judges’ political ideol-
ogy.30
We plot the resulting individual effects ATEs for all
13 issue areas in Figure 4.31 For each, we constructed the
top two models using the full, unmatched data and the
bottom two models, from the matched data.32 Note that
30Some scholars use political party as a proxy for ideology (e.g.,
Sunstein et al. 2006). Although our general preference is to use the
continuous Judicial Common Space scores (Epstein et al. 2007),
our tests (unreported here) incorporating party as a substitute
for this measure indicate that it makes no difference in the overall
substantive results of themodels. (Becauseparty and ideology are so
highly correlated, we only include one in the analysis.) In addition
to the treatment and the ideology, all fully specified models house
the covariates identified in Table 5 in the appendix, alongwith fixed
effects for the decision year.
31We report the Title VII sex discrimination logistic regression
estimates (individual and panel effects) in the appendix, Table 5.
Because of space limitations, we provide all other estimates on the
project’s web site.
32In our multivariate analysis of the matched campaign finance
data, the results failed to converge, and as such, we do not report
ATEs for this model.
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FIGURE 3 Kernel Density Plots of the Estimated Propensity Score
for the ADA and Title VII Sex Discrimination Panel
Effects Analyses
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The black lines depict the density for all-male panels (control); the grey lines for mixed-sex
panels (treatment). Each left-hand panel represents the full datasets while the right-hand
panel displays the propensity scores for only the matched data.
almost without exception, female and male judges do not
reach different decisions. To be sure, for theADAand cap-
ital punishment cases, the results of the naive, unmatched
analyses seem to indicate that female judges are more lib-
eral. But this turns out to be an artifact of imbalances
in the data; for both the naive and multivariate models,
the matched data analyses reveal no significant effects.
Note too (and in contrast to some existing empirical re-
sults), the matched data findings show that the judges’
sex has no bearing on the direction of their votes in sex-
ual harassment, affirmative action, or abortion litigation.
These findings might give pause to proponents of repre-
sentational and, especially, “different voice” accounts of
gendered judging.
One exception to this general finding of “no differ-
ence” emerges, however, and it tends to support informa-
tional approaches while discounting organizational the-
ories: female and male judges differ significantly in their
treatment of Title VII sex discrimination suits. On aver-
age, the probability of female judges voting in favor of the
plaintiff in a sex discrimination case is around 0.10 higher
than it is for male judges—a difference with meaning, as
Figure 5 indicates.
There we depict the predicted probabilities of men
and women casting liberal (pro-plaintiff) votes in sex
discrimination cases as a function of their ideology and
the gender of the majority opinion’s author. Note that
the estimated probability of a female judge voting in fa-
vor of the plaintiff (when a female judge is the majority
opinion writer) is over 0.61 at the highest levels of lib-
eralism; for even the most left-of-center male, that fig-
ure is closer to 0.50. When the case has a male majority
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TABLE 3 Matching Summary Statistics for the Panel Effects Analyses for ADA and Title VII Sex
Discrimination Cases
ADA Cases
Full Data (N = 1648) Matched Data (N = 1383)
Mean Mean eQQ Percent Mean Mean eQQ
Variable Treated Control Med Reduction Treated Control Med
Propensity Score 0.36 0.29 0.06 93.37 0.36 0.36 0.04
Minority Judge 0.12 0.10 0.00 97.32 0.12 0.12 0.00
Judicial Experience 0.43 0.49 0.00 93.15 0.43 0.44 0.00
Judicial Common Space 0.05 0.07 0.01 63.57 0.05 0.05 0.01
Confirmation Year 1985.70 1984.93 1.00 99.67 1985.70 1985.70 0.00
(Title VII) Sex Discrimination Cases
Full Data (N = 1075) Matched Data (N = 843)
Mean Mean eQQ Percent Mean Mean eQQ
Variable Treated Control Med Reduction Treated Control Med
Propensity Score −0.83 −1.25 0.41 77.55 −0.83 −0.92 0.21
Judicial Experience 0.43 0.46 0.00 100.00 0.43 0.43 0.00
Minority Judge 0.08 0.10 0.00 34.99 0.08 0.07 0.00
Judicial Common Space 0.09 0.11 0.02 59.00 0.09 0.08 0.02
Confirmation Year 1984.66 1984.55 0.00 · 1984.66 1983.76 1.00
The left portion of each table provides results for the full, unmatched data, while the right portion displays results after matching has taken
place. eQQ med is the median difference in the empirical quantile-quantile plot (an eQQ med of zero is ideal). See also note 34.
opinion writer, the likelihood of a liberal male judge vot-
ing in favor of sex discrimination plaintiffs is less than
0.38.
What is especially interesting about these results, we
believe, is that they may have gone undetected had we
employed the standard procedure (i.e., estimating a logit
model with unbalanced data). Note that in the full, un-
matched sexdiscriminationdatadisplayed inFigure 4, at a
0.05 level of statistical significance, no difference emerges
between male and female judges.33 Only via matching
and balancing were we able to unearth what amounts to
a fairly important sex-based distinction.
Panel Effects
Turning to panel effects, recall that accounts of sex-based
judging are nearly of one mind. Of the four, only infor-
mational accounts suggest that a female may influence
her male colleagues and then only in sex discrimination
cases. As it turns out, our results are consistent with this
33The p-value on the judge-sex variable indicator is 0.161.
one account; they also parallel the findings for individual
effects (see Figure 4).34
As Figure 6 indicates, for most types of disputes male
judges serving on mixed-sex panels do not vote differ-
ently than male judges serving on all-male panels. As
was the case for individual effects, the naive, unbalanced
ADA and capital punishment analyses indicate statistical
significance but yet again the matched data analyses do
not support the conclusion of a genuine difference based
on panel composition. More importantly, our analyses
identify no significant differences in several areas (e.g.,
sex harassment and affirmative action) where others pre-
viously reported them (e.g., Cameron and Cummings
2003; Peresie 2005).
Where strong and systematic panel effects emerge
is in precisely the same area we observed them in the
34In a few instances, we found that the unmatched data were suf-
ficiently balanced. For these datasets (abortion, affirmative action,
campaign finance, Contract Clause, EPA, and piercing the cor-
porate veil) we only report average treatment effects for the un-
matched data. Note, though, that only after estimating propensity
score models and comparing the summary statistics across models
were we able to come to the conclusion that we could appropriately
analyze these datasets without matching observations.
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FIGURE 5 Predicted Probabilities of Pro-Plaintiff Votes in Title
VII Sex Discrimination Cases as a Function of the
Judicial Common Space (Ideology) and the Gender of
the Majority OpinionWriter for Male and Female
Judges, Individual Effects
The Judicial Common Space runs from most liberal (here, −0.6) to most conservative
(0.6). These estimates are from the weighted logistic regression model on matched data.
All continuous variables are held at their sample means; other variables are at their sample
modes. The vertical grey lines denote 95% confidence intervals.
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individual effects analyses: sex discrimination. Consistent
with informational accounts, for not one sex discrimina-
tionmodel displayed in Figure 6 does the 95% confidence
interval come near the zero line (indicating no difference
between male judges serving on all-male and mixed-sex
panels). Rather, we observe causal effects ranging from
0.12 to 0.14—meaning that the likelihood of amale judge
ruling in favor of the plaintiff increases by 12% to 14%
when a female sits on the panel.35
Not only is this a fairly large difference but, at least
from the perspective of litigants, it is also quite conse-
quential, as Figure 7 shows. Notice that for all-male pan-
els the probability of supporting the plaintiff in a sex
discrimination dispute never exceeds 0.20—not even for
the most liberal of male judges. But for mixed-sex panels,
the probability never falls below 0.20 for even the most
conservative males. For males at relatively average levels
of ideology, the likelihood of a liberal, pro-plaintiff vote
increases by almost 85%when sitting with a female judge.
Seen in this way, the results for sex discrimination
panel effects mirror our findings for individual effects:
for both, we find evidence of statistical significance and
substantive importance. In fact, the only difference of
note between the two sets of results centers on matters
of methodology. In the case of individual effects we ob-
serve disparate results between the traditional regression-
based analyses on the unmatched data and the analyses
on thematched data; for panel effects, no such differences
emerge.
Why? Themost plausible answer, as we hinted earlier,
is that random assignment to panels, while an imperfect
selectionmechanism, produces data that reasonablymeet
the assumption of independent assignment to treatment.
This implies, in turn, that panel data will be close to
balanced, or, at the least, more balanced than under the
complete absence of randomization.36 But it does not
imply, to reiterate, that balancing via matching is per
se unnecessary for panel data. Quite the opposite. The
danger of assuming a balanced dataset is far greater than
35On its face, this causal effect of panel composition is quite sub-
stantial, perhaps surprisingly so. Think about it this way. Because
panels with female judges are significantly more plaintiff friendly
than all-male panels, defendants should be more likely to settle
after they observe assignment to a mixed-sex panel. To the extent
that this form of selection bias exists, it ought to mitigate against
a finding of a strong causal panel effect. As a result, our find-
ings, however substantial, may actually underestimate the impact
of panel composition on outcomes.
36To see this point, compare, e.g., the left-hand panels of Figures 2
and 3. This point also helps explain why, in certain issue areas in
our study, further balancing of the original data turned out to be
unnecessary.
the perils of semiparametric balancing; the former can
easily lead to severe errors of inference, while the latter
cannot (see, e.g., Ho et al. 2007; Greiner 2006). Scholars
should be no more willing to deploy regression-based
tools to analyze nonexperimentally generated data than
they would be to use, say, linear regression to estimate
a model with a binary dependent variable (regardless of
whether it yields results no different than a probitmodel).
Best practice, of course, demands that we always use the
most appropriate tool at our disposal. For even if themost
and least suitable methods supply the same answer for a
set of analyses of a particular set of data—as was the case
here for panel effects—this will not always or even usually
hold.
Discussion
Ever since the campaign to place women on the federal
bench began in earnest, supporters have emphasized both
the symbolic and the practical implications of appointing
female judges. While the first is primarily a matter for
normative theorists, the second is susceptible to empiri-
cal scrutiny. And that is what we have attempted to give
it here. Drawing on empirical expectations from four ac-
counts (different voice, representational, informational,
and organizational), we proceeded from a formal frame-
work for causal inference to answer questions that have
long dominated scholarly and policy discourse over the
role of sex in judging.
The results of this exercise are now reasonably clear:
the presence of women in the federal appellate judiciary
rarely has an appreciable empirical effect on judicial out-
comes. Rarely, though, is not never. Based on an account
that isolates the analysis to judge-vote observations with
a nearest-neighbor match, we observe consistent and sta-
tistically significant individual and panel effects in sex
discrimination disputes: not only do males and females
bring distinct approaches to these cases, but the presence
of a female on a panel actually causes male judges to vote
in a way they otherwise would not—in favor of plain-
tiffs. Characterized in this way, our results are consistent
with an informational account of gendered judging; they
also serve to reinforce other studies that identified gender
effects in the employment area. Finally, our results may
provide empirical fodder for a class of normative claims
supportive of diversity on the bench; namely, “the greater
the diversity of participation by [judges] of different back-
grounds and experiences, the greater the range of ideas
and information contributed to the institutional process,”
and the higher the likelihood of altered deliberations in
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FIGURE 7 Predicted Probabilities of Pro-Plaintiff Votes in Title
VII Sex Discrimination Cases as a Function of the
Judicial Common Space (Ideology) for All-Male
(Control) andMixed-Sex (Treatment) Panels
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Control Group (All-Male Panels)
Judicial Common Space
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 a
 P
ro
−
Pl
ai
nt
iff
 V
o
te
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Treatment Group (Mixed−Sex Panels)
Judicial Common Space
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 a
 P
ro
−
Pl
ai
nt
iff
 V
o
te
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
The Judicial Common Space runs frommost liberal (here,−0.6) to most conservative (0.6).
These estimates are from the weighted logistic regression model on the matched data. All
continuous variables are held at their sample means; other variables are at their sample
modes. The vertical grey lines denote 95% confidence intervals.
response (Epstein et al. 2003, 944; see also Cameron and
Cummings 2003).
While we hope our study goes some distance toward
answering important questions in the literature, we also
think that the very questions we addressed here continue
to deserve a prominent place on the scholarly agenda. It
seems entirely worthwhile, for example, to consider the
extent to which our findings transport to other colle-
gial courts, both here and abroad, and to other stages in
the litigation process. We also can imagine extending the
analyses to cover other attributes, including race, religion,
and age.
We certainly commend these challenges to scholars
working in the fields of public law, gender politics, and
race and ethnicity. Going forward, we also encourage
the use of the general framework and methods deployed
here—as do a growing number of other political scien-
tists who too now call for a reconsideration of the field’s
traditional and dominant approach to inference (e.g.,
Epstein et al. 2005; Greiner 2008; Ho et al. 2007). To
them, reliance on regression analyses of unmatched data
far too often leads to unreliable andmisleading results. In
light of the findings here, along with promising develop-
ments in the statistical sciences aimed at improving the
conclusions we can draw from observational data, their
message seems especially timely.
This is almost certainly true for the burgeoning schol-
arship on the extent towhich female legislators better rep-
resent women’s interests compared to their male counter-
parts (e.g.,Dodson2008;Reingold2000; Swers 2002)—an
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area in which the same sort of imbalances we identified
maywell be present. But it alsomay hold for research out-
side the gender (or race) realm. In one of the few previous
studies on judicial behavior that adopted a potential-
outcomes framework—Epstein and colleagues’ (2005)
analysis of the effect ofwar onSupremeCourt decisions—
the authors found imbalance on the key causal variable:
liberal courts, relative to conservative courts, were more
likely to decide cases during war times. Had Epstein et al.
failed to correct for this imbalance via propensity score
matching, they would have reached the highly misleading
conclusion that the Court wasmore likely to protect indi-
vidual rights in the middle of a war. Of course, the extent
to which imbalance plagues other research on judging or
legislating is an empirical question that researchers must
evaluate for their particular projects. At the very least,
though, our study, in line with the few others in this area,
counsels in favor of such evaluations.
Appendix: Datasets and Selected Logistic Regression Estimates
TABLE A1 The Issue Areas, Years, and Sample Sizes (Measured in Votes) for the Datasets
Sample Size
Individual Effects Panel Effects
Issue Area Years Full Data Matched Data Full Data Matched Data
Abortion 1982-2002 297 132 270 –
ADA 1998-2002 1956 890 1648 1383
Affirmative Action 1978-2002 447 178 411 –
Campaign Finance 1976-2002 165 58 149 –
Capital Punishment 1995-2002 543 289 450 346
Contract Clause 1977-2002 222 103 201 –
EPA 1994-2002 186 100 147 –
Federalism 1995-2002 816 434 679 544
Piercing the Corporate Veil 1995-2002 318 165 274 –
(Title VII) Sex Discrimination 1995-2002 1245 590 1075 843
Sex Harassment 1995-2002 1116 594 952 784
Takings Clause 1978-2002 624 279 561 278
(Title VII) Race 1985-2002 960 468 828 639
These data originated from Sunstein et al. (2006) and were supplemented by the authors. In explaining why (and how) the years studied
varied depending on the issue area studied, Sunstein et al. say, “We extended the viewscreen to earlier cases when the post-1995 sample was
small. In deciding how far back to look, we typically relied on starting dates marked by important Supreme Court decisions that would
predictably be cited in relevant cases” (Sunstein et al. 2004, n. 35). While the Sunstein et al. article (2004) and book (2006) consider sex
harassment cases both as a part of sex discrimination cases and separately, we consider them only in the latter fashion. In addition, we limit
our examination of sex discrimination cases to only those brought under Title VII. Those datasets in the panel effects context that were
sufficiently balanced and did not require matching (abortion, affirmative action, campaign finance, Contract Clause, EPA, and piercing
the corporate veil) have sample sizes reported only for the unbalanced data.
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TABLE A2 Logistic Regression Estimates for the Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, Individual and
Panel Effects
Individual Effects Panel Effects
Full: Matched: Full: Matched:
Full: Multi- Matched: Multi- Full: Multi- Matched: Multi-
Covariates Naive variate Naive variate Naive variate Naive variate
(Intercept) −0.68∗ 12.68 −0.66∗ 72.97∗ −0.83∗ 3.94 −0.93∗ 7.59
(0.06) (12.78) (0.10) (22.22) (0.08) (13.59) (0.09) (15.11)
Treatment 0.44∗ 0.28 0.42∗ 0.46∗ 0.54∗ 0.65∗ 0.63∗ 0.72∗
(0.17) (0.20) (0.19) (0.22) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Judge Ideology −0.79∗ −1.06∗ −0.79∗ −0.75∗
(0.21) (0.31) (0.23) (0.26)
Year of Birth −0.01 −0.04∗ −0.00 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Minority Judge 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.65∗
(0.21) (0.27) (0.23) (0.30)
Lower Court 1.08∗ 1.12∗ 1.10∗ 1.03∗
Direction (0.14) (0.24) (0.15) (0.18)
Circuit Ideology −0.11 −0.26 −0.05 −0.03
(0.30) (0.40) (0.33) (0.36)
Female Maj. 0.46∗ 0.51∗
Opin. Writer (0.18) (0.23)
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗p< 0.05
N : 1245 1245 590 590 1075 1075 843 843
Log-Likelihood: −797.42 −700.10 −338.49 −255.48 −673.83 −590.15 −508.98 −420.95
Average treatment effects reported in Figures 4 and 6 are derived from these estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. To conserve
space, estimates of year fixed effects are not reported. The naive models include only the treatment (for individual effects a female judge,
for panel effects a mixed-sex panel) as a covariate. The other models include the treatment, ideology, and other reported covariates. Similar
regression tables for the 12 other issue areas are reported in the online appendix.
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